South Sudan Peace Deal Meets Harsh Claims
South Sudan continues to face the challenge of turning signed peace commitments into daily security and governance. An opinion investigation argues that, away from public scrutiny, preparations for renewed conflict are taking shape through recruitment practices and regional security coordination, especially in Bahr el Ghazal and Central Equatoria.
Allegations of Coercive Recruitment into NSS and Units
The article alleges that men, and in some cases women, are absorbed into the National Security Service (NSS) and affiliated units through coercion rather than voluntary enlistment. It describes arrests without charge and detention in “legal grey zones”, with release reportedly linked to agreeing to join security structures.
According to the opinion piece, civilians include prisoners and street youth. It also claims children are affected, citing estimates of thousands allegedly recruited, some as young as 10, and exposed to abuse and psychological trauma. The author says patterns recur across specific towns, suggesting deliberate targeting.
How Recruits Are Integrated and Deployed
After recruitment, individuals are reportedly assigned to duties from patrols to frontline roles. The article claims many receive little or no training, with brief orientation used to enforce command structures and standard procedures rather than professional preparation.
It further alleges coerced recruits fill gaps created by desertions within the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF). The opinion account links desertions to difficult conditions, especially salary delays that, it claims, can extend for months or even up to a year.
Logistics, Pay, and Battlefield Conditions
The investigation describes severe resource constraints, alleging recruits are sent to the front with inadequate equipment and improper clothing. In the author’s telling, these conditions weaken operational effectiveness and expose individuals to avoidable risks.
The article contrasts this with claims about funding for foreign deployments. It alleges Ugandan soldiers are financed with relative ease, citing a reported minimum of USD 200 per month per soldier, while many SSPDF members remain unpaid for extended periods, reflecting contested budget priorities.
Jonglei Deployments and Training Claims in Bahr el Ghazal
The opinion piece states that more than 1,700 recruits from Bahr el Ghazal were deployed to Jonglei State on January 20, 2026, within SSPDF formations, and that some were reportedly in their early teens. It also claims tens of thousands were undergoing training in Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap.
It argues that monitoring and tightly coordinated troop movements near recruitment hubs limit desertion and make exit difficult. Over time, the author says, this leads to permanent absorption into the security apparatus, strengthening short-term capacity while increasing state control.
Uganda’s Role in South Sudan Security Cooperation
Uganda officially frames its presence as security-related, the article notes. However, it claims investigative evidence suggests deeper involvement in surveillance, opposition deterrence, and coordination with South Sudanese forces.
A senior South Sudanese national security officer in Juba, cited anonymously, is quoted as confirming a specialised Ugandan unit deployment to Jonglei on January 17, 2026, shortly after clashes near Duk County. The article says the unit coordinated with the NSS and the Tiger Division.
Cross-Border Claims Beyond Uganda
Beyond Uganda, the opinion investigation alleges engagement with Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF). It claims that on November 13, 2025, two senior NSS officers met RSF leadership in North Darfur to discuss collaboration and compensation.
It also alleges RSF representatives were in Juba in early January 2026 for meetings with NSS personnel, with President Salva Kiir’s knowledge. The author frames this as a transactional approach to supplement combat capacity through cross-border ties.
Peace Messaging vs Alleged Covert Militarisation
The article argues that official peace-and-stability messaging diverges from what it describes as covert militarisation, including forced recruitment and ethnic mobilisation. It cites an unnamed SSPDF officer at Bilpham Headquarters as describing a “different reality” from public statements.
In the author’s assessment, peace rhetoric can function as political cover, limiting scrutiny and accountability. The opinion piece also claims conflict dynamics are shaped by identity-based mobilisation, particularly involving Bahr el Ghazal and opposition areas.
2018 Revitalised Agreement and Implementation Disputes
The opinion article situates these allegations within what it calls selective implementation of the 2018 revitalised peace agreement. It argues that key provisions—such as unified forces, depoliticised security services, and independent oversight bodies—remain incomplete.
It also claims unilateral reshuffles and removals of officials aligned with opposition signatories have weakened the power-sharing framework. The author presents these patterns as reinforcing executive control over security institutions rather than enabling reforms promised in the agreement.
Bahr el Ghazal as Recruitment Hub and Strategic Base
Bahr el Ghazal, particularly Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap, is portrayed as central to mobilisation. The article references historical precedents in which militias were mobilised before the 2013 civil war and later integrated into formal structures, arguing today’s practices echo that history.
It claims that on December 23, 2025, President Kiir issued a secret authorisation granting broad recruitment and resource powers to senior security officials. The text names Gen. Paul Nang Majok, Lt. Col. Angelo Kuot Garang, Gen. Johnson Olony, and Major Gen. Garang Ariath.
Case Studies Cited by the Opinion Investigation
The author presents cases to illustrate alleged coercion. One is Biliu Kuol Bateng, described as a young man from Mayom County, Unity State, believed to be under 18, who was reportedly detained and conscripted, then captured by SPLA-IO during clashes around January 17, 2026.
A second case is Patrick Gore, 15, from Central Equatoria State. The article claims his family faced threats while seeking information, and that he escaped a security facility on January 19, 2026, reaching Munuki district around 11:00 pm.
A third case is Chan Nyatuol, described as an elderly man from Guit County, Unity State. The opinion piece alleges he was deceived into a staged meeting and forced into a vehicle for transfer to Jonglei to fight opposition forces, based on family testimony.
High-Level Statements and Rising Fears
The investigation claims high-level sources see the country moving toward broader war. It cites Gen. Johnson Olony, described as SSPDF Assistant Chief of Defence Forces for Mobilization and Disarmament, addressing Agwelek fighters on January 24, 2026.
The article quotes him saying, “When we arrive there, do not spare an elderly person, do not spare a chicken, do not spare a house—anything.” It states the remarks drew condemnation and intensified fears about escalation and civilian harm.
Regional Risks and the Stakes for Neighbours
The opinion text argues that alleged coerced mobilisation, combined with foreign support, heightens risks of renewed ethnic and political violence. It also raises claims of banned weapons use and warns this could amplify humanitarian strain and social trauma.
It further suggests that a return to large-scale conflict would affect neighbours including Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia through displacement and arms flows. The author calls for sustained monitoring, while stressing that many claims remain contested and difficult to verify publicly.
What This Opinion Investigation Ultimately Argues
Overall, the piece presents a narrative of systematic recruitment, rapid deployment, and external security partnerships as a deliberate architecture of conflict preparation, rather than crisis-driven improvisation. It frames these allegations as evidence of state power being built through coercion.
The original article is credited to Duop Chak Wuol and published as an opinion item, with a disclaimer that the views are the author’s own and that responsibility for factual claims rests with the writer (Radio Tamazuj).